aspect of the Community principle of non-discrimination. This entails considerable implications regarding the margin the domestic legislator has in various fields and in which case-law delivers ostensive examples. 2 The exercise of the rights of free movement of the citizens of the Union plays surely an important role when defining the scope of application of the Treaty according to Article 12 EC.
Case-law concerning the significance of the right to free movement for the scope of application of the Treaty has been greatly developed in the past 20 years, and the introduction of Union citizenship in the EC has played an important role in this regard. See the proofs in note 4 infra. 3 The determination of 'the scope of application of the Treaty' is necessarily subject to change inasmuch as the latter can or must develop in the course of the modification of the See also the proofs in note 8 infra. 6 See also in this context F. Wollenschläger, 'Anmerkung', (2005) Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 2005, 309, 311, who indicates that relating to the dogmatic derivation of the opening of the scope of application of Article 12(1) EC there is 'no coherent approach' in jurisdiction. Whether this applies in such an absolute manner must be questioned. In fact it should be possible to derive a certain dogmatic line from the relevant judgements of the ECJ (infra III). Even though the ECJ does not comment -as it will be shown (infra II) -on different questions very clearly.
In the following, we will try -based on case-law that will not be discussed here again 7 -to assemble a roundup of jurisprudence with the purpose to deduce relevant principles from the multitude of individual cases of the ECJ (II), these principles allowing a conspectus of the standards of application of Article 12 EC. The contribution concludes with a final summary in which we briefly evaluate the latitude of the scope of application of Article 12 EC and therewith the (remaining) margin of the Member States (III).
It is clear, therefore, that the case-law -which in part is vehemently criticised 8 -will not be extensively questioned here again. 9 It is rather a question of how the case-law principles can be translated into a consistent dogmatic concept that establishes the premises to engage the scope of application of the Treaty (in virtue of Article 12 EC) relating to the rights of free movement.
II Some Guidelines for the Scope of Application of the Treaty Regarding the Rights of Free Movement
If one tries to formulate criteria to engage the scope of application of the See though the brief evaluation below (infra III). The possibility to apply these rights efficiently could come to sustainable harm if discriminations on grounds of nationality were to be allowed respectively could not be measured on the Community law scale. Altogether it can be resumed that if secondary law concedes rights to third country nationals, they can, in principle, invoke Article 12(1) EC. However, it always has to be examined specifically whether the scope of application rationae materiae is involved by using parallel criteria like for citizens of the Union.
ii) However, when answering the question of whether a certain person can invoke Article 12(1) EC in a particular situation, the scope of application rationae personae is not at issue, but the rationae materiae one is. Therefore, it becomes clear that the reference to the 'scope of application' in Article 12(1) EC concerns in the first place the content of a certain measure, whereas this is determined by the concerned or the entitled person respectively, as well as by the subject matter. 
B Relevance of the Pertinent Primary and Secondary Law
The ECJ 16 resorts to provisions in primary law (the existence of a certain policy, for instance) in some judgments related to the debate of the scope of application of the Treaty or/and to an existing secondary law provision, although, in some other judgments not. Also while resorting to existing (primary or secondary) law it is not clear which significance it has in relation to engaging the scope of application of the Treaty in terms of Article 12 EC. According to this, it remains unclear whether the 'reference' (however such a criterion might be interpreted, this point in case-law remains, after all, in the dark because of the simple reference to existing law) to existing law allegorises an additional, separate criterion besides the apparently necessary relationship with the use of the fundamental freedoms and the free movement respectively. 20 In other words, it does not matter whether the particular regulation itself falls within the scope of application of the Treaty, but it is decisive that the exercise of the right of free movement is regulated by the Community. 21 Forasmuch it is necessary to proceed from a functional approach.
C Transboundary Reference
The Court clarified in several judgements that the scope rationae materiae of Article 12 EC is only involved in the case of a transboundary reference. This is not the place to discuss the qualification of this requirement. 22 In our context the requirements held by the ECJ to meet such a transboundary reference are conceivably low. Due to this, it is not necessary that the affected person has already used 19 In different cases though it is well conceivable that the scope of application of the Treaty is engaged through secondary law legislation. fundamental freedoms, whereas it should not be necessary in connection with the use of the rights to free movement in virtue of Article 18 EC. Finally, the view that the scope of application is engaged in cases in which the freedom of movement is used implies a relation of the arguable regulation to free movement; otherwise, there would be no reason to admit the scope of application of the Treaty on this basis.
If one proceeds from the hypothesis that the regularisation in question necessarily refers or has a relation to the right to free movement, the question of how this relation has to be shaped arises.
In other words, the question is the following: how close has the particular measure or regulation to be to the right of residence or of free movement? The ECJ does not discuss this issue explicitly. It might, however, act from the assumption that the reference should not meet any high demands, neither primary law and that the barriers of limitation of the right of residence that have to be applied in addition to secondary law have to be extracted from it (especially the obligation to respect the principle of proportionality). 36 Once the stay has been established legally, the mentioned principles concerning the establishment of the scope of application of the Treaty have to be applied. They also imply -as shown before -that social security payments can be included. Consequently, the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality is applicable.
A different question is whether and under which circumstances the right of residence can be 
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Insofar the criticism -that the relationship between primary and secondary law has been misconceived and that the conditions for the rights of free movement have been disregarded -on jurisdiction are not of proportionality in due consideration of all circumstances within which the interests of the concerned Member States and the severity of the interference on the free movement of persons have to be weighed.
D Excursus: Chosen Aspects of Justification
Finally, the question of justification shall briefly be elaborated, since at least substantive discriminations on the basis of nationality 40 can be justified by public interest reasons. The ECJ had to deal in the above 41 mentioned cases with the justification in which the question of proportionality was often the centre of interest. The correlation between those obtaining a certain social contribution (the so called 'tideover allowances') and the concerned territorial labour market, 42 the homogeneity of the national education system 43 or the protection of a language minority, 44 for instance, were accepted as public interest reasons. In this context, the statements of the ECJ in connection with the possible defence of a substantive discrimination concerning the grant of a student loan for maintenance is of special interest. 
III Summary
One can summarise that according to ECJ case-law the scope of application of the Treaty is engaged under the following conditions when the using of free movement of persons has been established: i) A cross-border connection is given.
ii) The Union Citizen concerned resides legally in the host Member State.
iii) The measure in question or the regulation has a connection with the residence or facilitates it. This condition will be regularly fulfilled, since nearly every (national) regulation has a direct or indirect effect on the stay. In the first place, one can think of exceptions in cases in which it clearly results from the Treaty that a certain subject matter should not be influenced in any form by European Law, such as the right to elect for the national Parliament.
A general link to primary or secondary law is on the other hand not necessary. Secondary law, however, can be significant in connection with the lawful residence.
Nevertheless, if the scope of application of the Treaty is engaged, possible discriminations on grounds of nationality can still be justified. However, the ECJ assumes apparently that the Member
States can limit the circle of beneficiaries because of objective reasons in virtue of the general interest of financial balance for the systems of social security.
Manifestly, the scope of application of the Treaty in terms of Article 12 EC and therefore of the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality is conceivably comprehensive. Barely a field of domestic law can be excluded from the scope of application of Article 12 EC. This approach of the ECJ -which was subject to partially vehement criticism 47 -is convincing, though, regrettably the reasoning of the judgements is not always very distinct. This results from the establishment of the right of free movement of Union citizens in primary law in interaction with Article 12 EC. Once
Union citizens used their right to free movement and integrated in another Member State, the concern of the right to free movement is to grant Union Citizens the same treatment as their own citizens, inasmuch as there is a context with matters of their residence. Otherwise, the right to free movement would be reduced ad absurdum. 48 However, it should not be misjudged that the margin of the national 47 See the proofs in note 8 supra.
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Insofar similarly von Bogdandy and Bitter, op. cit. note 27 supra, at 316.
legislator is correspondingly confined and that a part of the national legislation that can hardly be overlooked is concerned by Community law, so that the ECJ is, ultimately, granted decisive competences. In the light of the introduction of Union citizenship and the grant of the rights to free movement, this seems to be -for the above mentioned reasons -a compelling consequence of this step within the integration process. Furthermore, one has to remember the possibility of justification for objective reasons. It should not be asked too much from the Member States to prove an objective reason and the proportionality of a regulation in case of a (substantive) discrimination of a Union citizen who resides legally on its territory. Against this background the fears that jurisdiction might entail a sort of 'social assistance tourism' or an excessive harmonisation of certain fields of secondary law 49 seem to be at least exaggerated.
